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IS ‘EDUCATION’ BECOMING IRRELEVANT IN OUR RESEARCH?
R Scott Webster
Faculty of Education
Monash University
Abstract
It is argued in this paper that in a culture of
‘performativity’ research into ‘education’
is often avoided. It is observed in many
research publications that attention is given
to techniques of learning, teaching,
management, social equity, identity
formation, leadership and delivery of the
curriculum, without a justification being
offered as to why such instrumental
approaches should be regarded as being
‘educational’.
Often research quite
unproblematically
adopts
rationaleconomic justifications couched in terms of
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’.
Such
approaches are however identified as
nihilistic and not educational (Blake et al.,
2000).
In his book After Virtue (1984), Alasdair
MacIntyre argues that the language of
morality is under a state of grave disorder.
It is here argued that similarly the language
of education is also under threat of
becoming ‘irrelevant’ in a highly
technocratic world. Pring (2000) describes
the discourse of education as consisting of
five concepts: learning; teaching; process;
worthwhileness; and personhood. It is
proposed here that these latter three in
particular are too often being neglected in
our research. This paper seeks to examine
how
these
two
concepts
of
‘worthwhileness’ and ‘personhood’ are
integral to education, and how researchers
may usefully integrate these into their own
research practices.
Introduction
According to MacIntyre, the language of
morality has been lost. He argues that
while we continue to use some terminology
specific to morality, these terms remain as
1

only “fragments of a conceptual scheme”
for
which
we
have
“lost
our
comprehension” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 2).
It is suggested here that such a situation
also appears to be evident regarding the
language of education. In recent times, for
educational research and educational
practice, the concept of ‘education’ is
becoming at best marginalised and
frequently avoided altogether. Across preservice, in-service and professional
development courses that claim to major in
education the focus is usually given to
techniques, skills, methods, competencies
and styles of doing to such a degree that it
is often difficult to view the discipline
other than as an applied science.
Current research into education likewise
often focuses narrowly upon more specific
issues such as learning, teaching,
leadership, management, social equity,
identity formation, curriculum design and
delivery.
It would appear that the
significance of such issues for ‘education’
is self-evident. However, it is contended
here that the concept of ‘education’, just
like the conceptual scheme of morality to
which MacIntyre refers, is being
marginalised to the extent of becoming
absent altogether from research that is
presumably examining this discipline, due
to the almost exclusive emphasis being
given to such particular issues as those
listed above.
Researching under performativity
A common justification for placing an
ever-increasing
emphasis upon the
technical and instrumental aspects related
to learning and skill development is,
according to Rumberger (1998), to meet
the perceived challenges of globalization
Vol. 29, No. 1, June. 2004
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and economic utility. Training for job
specific attributes are readily grounded in
the arena of the competitive globalized
market and therefore are a much more
popular reform for those held accountable
at the political level. Consequently the
demands for accountability have fostered a
culture of performance objectives that can
readily be ‘measured’ in terms of
efficiency and effectiveness. The ‘value’ or more accurately the ‘effectiveness’ - of
university research for example, can be
reduced only to its relevance and
usefulness “to the national economy”
(Cowen, 1996, p. 246).
Lyotard has predicted much of this through
his notion of ‘performativity’.
The
implication of this for education is that its
own ‘relevance’ is to be determined by
how it specifically fulfils the needs of the
social system, which can be essentially
reduced to the global economic system
(Usher and Edwards, 1994). These ‘needs’
of society include the ‘production’ of
specialised experts who can “tackle world
competition” and the training of skilled
personnel necessary to maintain the
“internal cohesion” of society (Lyotard,
1984, p. 48). These skilled practitioners
are to be valued exclusively for their
pragmatic roles rather than for the potential
emancipatory influence for society that
they were once formerly presumed to have
as in their role as the educated elite. In
certain contexts, humanity is being valued
only in economic terms, either as market
labour or as ’human capital’.
This
tendency can be seen to be occurring to
such an extent that “large segments of the
population everywhere are becoming
irrelevant” (Chauvin, 1998, p. 9).
The key ingredients for surviving in this
rapidly changing, highly technological and
information rich global market appear to be
competitiveness and profitability, both of
which determine technological innovation
and productive growth (Castells, 1996).
Consequently education has been argued to
be a “key to future economic prosperity”
Vol. 29, No.1, June. 2004

(Brown et al., 1997, pp. 7-8). A tighter
relation between education and work is
needed to ensure economic prosperity, but
such a close and linear relation may result
in the subordination of education to
‘performativity’. We have witnessed both
education
and
training
occurring
concurrently within our schooling systems,
although it would now appear that certain
educative
aspects
are
becoming
marginalised (Margetson, 1997).
The dominance of economic interests over
general
or
‘liberal’
educational
programmes is already becoming evident
according to a recent Australian Council of
Educational Research report (Ferrier,
1998). The impact upon our national
schooling systems as a result of prioritising
the ‘needs’ of society as Lyotard described,
over the needs of individuals to becoming
more fully human, is likely to be immense,
as the whole notion of education is not
only being compromised but is now under
threat due to the ever-increasing demand
for training.
Here in Australia, the amalgamation of
government employment departments with
those of education and training, appear to
indicate that the enterprise of education is
becoming
dominated
by
economic
imperatives. This domination is becoming
so persuasive in the rational economic
wake of Reagan and Thatcher, that it is
argued by Lawton and Cowen (2001, p. 17)
that “we are now accustomed to the
discourse that stresses the relationship
between education systems and economics
[my emphasis]. Blake et al. (2000, pp. 1314) conclude that there is a “tranquillised
acceptance” of the technological approach
where “effectiveness is rather the most
nihilistic value ‘lording it under the holiest
name’” [my emphasis]. Pring (2000, p.25)
likewise argues “so mesmerized have we
become with the importance of ‘cost
efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ that we have
failed to see that the very nature of the
enterprise to be researched into has been
redefined” into something else other than
2
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‘education’. It is argued by Blake et al.
(2000) that the instrumental rationality so
readily adopted in a performance driven
environment is in fact a form of nihilism.
This is because their justification is to be
only found in functionality and as such
they are devoid of any values that could be
seen to make life more meaningful or
worthwhile. They argue that this socially
persuasive ‘commonsense’ view that is
associated with the ‘efficiency’ and
‘effectiveness’ of instrumentality “distracts
both individuals and social groups from
any informing sense of values” (Blake et
al., 2000, p. 41).
The attempted justifications to bleach out
certain value aspects of education by recent
governmental reforms often appear to refer
to a need to regard “education as an
economic
input”
(Department
of
Education, Queensland, 1996, p. 16).
Educative notions of individual flourishing,
well-being and fulfilment of potential are
not readily justified in current pluralistic
environments where the demand is upon
performativity (Kiziltan et al., 1990, p.
366). What is often overlooked however
is that the evaluative aspects of the
educative development of persons do have
value in an economically competitive
market and are not diametrically opposed
or irrelevant to it.
Marginalising or
ignoring the values intrinsic to a liberal
notion of education cannot be afforded, as
they do have a relevant “place in and
contribution to the furthering of the values
and value frameworks of modern society”
(Bagnall, 1990, p. 46). The development
of educated and ethically responsible
individuals for example, can be argued to
be essential for any civilisation as the very
decisions that influence and determine the
future of society and the quality of life are
essentially moral decisions and are not
purely technical or economic (Hughes,
1991, pp. 38-39).
It would appear that if an uncritical
adoption of Lyotard's performativity
criterion were to be unquestioningly
3

adopted by practitioners and researchers of
education, then indeed we may continue to
use some of the key terminology of
education such as learning, teaching,
curriculum and management, but, as with
MacIntyre’s thesis, we would fail to
comprehend education itself. In order to
avoid such a loss of comprehension, it is
argued to be necessary that educators
continue to make a concerted effort in
preventing an assumption that ‘education’
is becoming irrelevant in a highly
technocratic and instrumentalist society.

The nature and discourse of education
In this postmodern era, the idea of
education is open to greater scrutiny
because it has lost its former assumed
authority and the societal consensus of the
‘good life’, which has for so long been
used to justify it has also been lost. Any
meaning attributed to education has now
been problematised to the point that a
universal understanding of education can
be considered to have all but disappeared
(Lawton & Gordon, 2002, p. 228-9;
Smeyers, 1995, pp. 109, 113).
Yet it is argued by Pring that with regards
to research it is important “to attend to the
‘logic of the discourse’ of that which is
researched into – in this case, ‘education’”
(Pring, 2000, p. 11). If education is to be
understood as a distinct discipline with its
own discourse, it needs to be sufficiently
differentiated from the other concepts that
have tended to obscure and even replace it,
such as learning, teaching, schooling,
training and curriculum.
While Pring
acknowledges that the meaning of the term
‘education’ is contestable, he does offer
five general characteristics as being
inherent to the concept. These include:
learning;
teaching;
process;
worthwhileness and personhood (Pring,
2000, pp. 13-24). It is considered here that
the latter three characteristics are being
neglected in much of our research.
Research tends to be focussed frequently
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on the key aspects of teaching and
learning, but as with MacIntyre’s thesis,
there appears to be a lack of
comprehension regarding the educative
nature of these individual aspects. An
exploration of Pring’s latter three
characteristics of process, worthwhileness
and personhood now follows in order to
review how integral they are for much of
the research that is conducted in the
discipline of education.
Process
Education is not equated with all types of
‘learning’ or ‘teaching’ but provides
criteria by which these activities may be
determined to be educational or not.
Education lies beyond these activities
themselves providing standards by which
they can be determined to be valuable and
worthwhile. Education therefore has to do
with particular kinds of learning and
teaching. According to Pring, the process
by which learning is attained must involve
a “distinctively human mode of acquiring
the understandings… there is an attempt to
make sense, a process on enquiry, a
questioning
of
solutions…
Hence
education is generally understood to
exclude ‘indoctrination’ or ‘conditioning’”
(Pring, 2000, p. 15).
Education is not to be equated with
‘training’ in the sense that some specific
outcome is to be developed which is valued
only for its extrinsic utility. Dewey (1985,
p. 16) argued that ‘training’ has more to do
with outer action and that ‘education’
refers more to the mental and emotional
dispositions of behaviour - although he
accepts that the distinction between the two
is not as clear as this. Education is also not
to be equated with ’indoctrination’ and the
two are often contrasted with each other.
Some educationalists have argued that
indoctrination refers to the intent of the
indoctrinator. This can be referred to as
the task (Neiman, 1989), but is a weak
descriptor because it does not omit the
activity of unintentional indoctrination.
Vol. 29, No.1, June. 2004

Referring to possible unintentional
indoctrination that can occur within an
open society, Rodger (1982, p. 31) claims
that students “may, however, have been
conditioned and thus effectively prevented
from feeling the importance of a whole
range of questions, and therefore of acting
upon them”. As a consequence of this lack
of sensitivity, Robinson (1977, p. 146)
concludes, “that an essential element of
growth can hardly begin”.
So an
unintentional outcome - be it an
‘indoctrination’ or ‘condition’, may not
necessarily involve the imposition of a
doctrine, but may foster a lack of
awareness of other important issues not
directly engaged with.
To conclude then, for a process of learning
to be considered as educational, it must
involve more that just skills development
or training. The mental and emotional
dispositions of learners, including their
intentions, are to be engaged. In order for
a process of learning to be educational, it
must promote thoughtful responses and
critical awareness amongst learners.
Processes that foster a lack of critical
awareness may, according to the previous
arguments by Rodger and Robinson, be
considered as indoctrinatory.
Worthwhileness
Education is more that just processes (eg.
experimentation) and products (eg. the skill
of critical thinking). For R. S. Peters
education includes the setting of criteria or
standards that are worthwhile. He argues
that what makes humankind unique is the
mind and that through education the mind
becomes more ‘valuable’ in that through
educative development there should be a
“change for the better” (R. S. Peters, 1965,
p. 91). He argues that becoming educated
in a worthwhile manner implies “(a) caring
about what is worth-while and (b) being
brought to care about it and to possess the
relevant knowledge or skill in a way that
involves at least a minimum of
understanding and voluntariness” (R.S.
4
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Peters, 1965, p. 97). His criterion of being
‘worthwhile’
“depends
upon
its
contribution to the development of persons
that permit them to live well.
Peters
has
been
criticised
for
overemphasising such a cognitive and
theoretical approach to the ‘mind’ and to
the educated ‘man’ rather than ‘person’,
but Mays (1970) and Fitzgibbons (1975)
question the public traditions and the
‘correctness’ used by Peters as criteria to
help analyse the concept of education. Not
only is his approach to the concept of
education seen to be emphasising
‘theoretical’ cognition at the expense of its
evaluative nature (Clark, 1976), but it also
appears to rely on a rather unambiguous
“modernistic belief in the autonomy of
ethics” (Blake et al., 1998, p. 28).
Nevertheless, some of the characteristics
identified by Peters regarding education
and of the educated person are still
considered to be valuable (Blake et al.,
200, p. 41; Lawton & Gordon, 2002, p.
196). In his book ‘Ethics and Education’
(1967), Peters outlines his Transcendental
Argument that offers some useful lines of
thinking about what learning activities and
what characteristics of the person are to be
considered as ‘worthwhile’ and therefore
educational. His argument is grounded in
his serious question that asks ‘What ought I
to do?’ or ‘How ought I to live?’. The
responses given will certainly change for
each context of the ‘world’ that persons are
to live well ‘in’, but the question itself
remains. For example, rather than aiming
simply to develop the cognitive abilities of
the ‘mind’, it is here argued that the task of
education is largely to focus on the beliefs
of individuals - the ways in which they
understand the world.
Peters’s whole
argument thus becomes tenuous if his
serious question fails to be asked by
someone. Nevertheless, we must look
beyond Peters to appreciate that his
question simply reflects an age-old concern
that has been central to education.
According to Lawton and Cowen (2001, p.
5

17), “defining how to live wisely in the
world (and not how to live well off [in] it)
has been the oldest educational question”.
The nature of the educational enterprise, as
argued for here, is considered to be
worthwhile if it encourages the critical and
creative
exercise
of
individual
intentionality for the purpose of allowing
one to take a responsible stand for the way
one holds beliefs about oneself and the
world (Young, 1992, p. 8).
Personhood
The concept of an ‘educated person’ has
been used to refer to educating a whole
person and is contrasted with a unidimensional approach such as purely
knowledge acquisition or cognitive
development of the mind. Buber (2002, p.
123) argued, “Education worthy of the
name is essentially education of character”,
of “always the person as a whole…that is,
as a unique spiritual-physical form”. The
enterprise of educating a person depends
upon having a worthwhile notion of
personhood.
Plato’s educated subject has a holistic and
harmonious aspect, where the learner’s
‘true’ nature, being understood as virtuous,
needs to be ‘led out’ through education. So
through Plato’s Socrates, knowledge and
virtue are assumed to be part of a person’s
nature. The concept of holistic education
has thus traditionally dealt with a broader
notion than knowledge acquisition or
development of the intellect only - ethical
development also being essential.
A
holistic approach has to do with the whole
person in the sense that he or she is
multidimensional, and the purpose of
education therefore “is to assist in the
formation of better people” (Bosacki &
Ota, 2000, p. 217, my emphasis). Such a
purpose conceives education as broadening
more than just cognitive abilities.
Richard Pring offers a description of
wholeness with regards to the person,
which, while including reference to the
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mind, indicates many other aspects. He
describes the educated person as follows First, one characteristic of being a person is
the capacity to think, to reflect, to make
sense of one’s experience, to engage
critically with the received values, beliefs
and assumptions that one is confronted
with - the development, in other words of
the powers of the mind.
A second characteristic of being a person is
the capacity to recognise others as persons
- as centres of consciousness and reason
like oneself.
Third, it is characteristic of being a person
that one acts intentionally, deliberately, and
thus can be held responsible for what one
does.
Finally, what is distinctive of personhood
is the consciousness not only of others as
persons but of oneself - a sense of one’s
own unity as a person, one’s own value and
dignity, one’s own capacity to think
through a problem, to persevere when
things get tough, to establish a platform of
values and beliefs whereby one can
exercise some control over one’s own
destiny. (Pring, 1988, quoted by Best,
1996, p. 4)
So while the abilities of the mind appear to
be the predominant aspects that have
relevance for education, there are other
important elements to being a person that
need to be developed through education,
such as a moral disposition towards others,
the responsible exercising of freedom and
experiencing an autonomy that allows one
to know oneself and how to live a
meaningful life for oneself and for others.
Surely these attributes are of utmost value
in a globalized context as they form the
basis from which decisions regarding
actions and interactions are made.
Education, then, involves the flourishing of
personal well-being, which includes having
desires ‘improved’ to become more
worthwhile by being informed and
Vol. 29, No.1, June. 2004

ethically guided. It would appear that the
epistemological emphasis for informing
and the ethical presuppositions are
reflected together in Aristotle’s statement
“human excellence is of two kinds,
Intellectual and Moral” (Chase, 1911, p.
26, my emphasis). Human well-being is
understood to flourish through education if
both of these aspects are fostered, along
with the a element of meaning-making
which includes one’s place and purpose in
the world, which can be used to
contextualise the other two. An education
that aims to enhance a learner’s well-being,
increasing his or her ability to live well in a
particular ‘world’, must necessarily
carefully take into consideration the nature
of the ‘world’ in which the learner has
presence.
However, in recent times the individual
person has been argued to be fragmented
(Bauman, 1995; Lyotard, 1991) and
contingent upon various traditions and
discourses that lie external to him or her
(Bagnall, 1995, p. 82). The notion of the
educated person has been problematised
because of this as it is seen to imply that an
aspect of personhood can be ‘finished’ in
some ‘unitary whole’. As a consequence,
reference to the idea of a holistic person
can “invite attack and derision” (Erricker et
al., 1997, p. 17). Fragmentation is argued
by some to have replaced the ideal of
holism (McLaughlin, 1996, p. 11), thereby
suggesting that the meaning-making
subject has disappeared altogether (Sarup,
1993, p. 181). The agency and autonomy
of the subject are brought into question
because ‘meaning’ is established through
social norms rather than through
individual, authentic creativity.
Løvlie (1992, p. 121) argues that the
disappearance of the holistic individual
with agency, referred to often as the
‘subject’, “stabs at the very heart” of the
ideal of personal autonomy as an
educational goal. The subject is no longer
considered to be the originator of meaning
or even intentions, and so the notion of an
6
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educated person that is disciplined into
ways of critical meaning-making is
problematised and the project of education
itself is threatened (Smeyers, 1995, p. 115).
However, the claims of fragmentation and
the disappearance of the subject do not
necessarily incapacitate educators by
announcing an end to education, but they
do encourage the recognition of aims of
education that are more modest (Standish,
1995, pp. 127, 133). The role of the
subject, and hence the educated person,
does not need to disappear altogether.
Kearney (1987) warns that educators
should be wary of slipping from a healthy
scepticism to denying the creative human
subject any role whatever in the shaping of
meaning. The previous metanarratives of
education, that included the holistic notion
of the educated person, now need to be
critiqued rather than eliminated (M. Peters,
1995, p. 395).
Researching Education
In order to study the discipline of education
with its evaluative nature, Blake et al.
(2000) suggest that it is important to
engage with personal narratives.
For
researchers this means engaging with the
intentionality of those persons we are
researching. This is regarded by R. S.
Peters (1970, p. 285) to be more important
than actions or behaviours. Researchers
cannot settle for ‘observable facts’ as
demonstrated via the behaviours of
individuals in order to make sense of their
meanings. The intentionality of agents
being researched must be engaged with in
order to better make sense of what is
observed (Searle, 1983, p. 28). Pring
(2000, p. 111) adds that “there is no ‘metanarrative’ or rationality” that can be
appealed to in order to explain the meaning
of acts. Adopting an instrumental or
scientific paradigm in educational research
is therefore limited simply because
persons, with their intentions and reasons,
do not readily lend themselves as
appropriate objects for a scientific study.

7

It is argued here that there may be great
value for researchers of education asking
Peters’s serious question to those being
studied and those responsible for producing
the policies and literature being examined.
By engaging with personal narratives, with
the intentions that persons have regarding
the worthwhileness of activities and their
notions of personhood that are to be
pursued, the evaluative nature of education
will be made prominent. Such an approach
would challenge any unquestioning
acceptance of ‘effective’ and ‘efficient’
criteria that are all too often accepted as
‘givens’ in a culture of performativity and
yet have little value for the enterprise of
education itself.
If research into education adopts
instrumental approaches as encouraged by
the performativity criterion, it will in effect
promote a form of nihilism because as
mentioned earlier, there is no justification
of value available beyond itself. In order
to avoid such a loss of value and therefore
the loss of ‘education’ itself, it is argued
here that researchers need to be
consciously addressing the nature and
discourse of education itself. This involves
engaging with the personal narratives and
intentions that practitioners and policymakers have regarding the worthwhileness
of activities and the notions of personhood
and how these are understood to promote
the educative enterprise of learning how to
live well.
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